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Abstract—In this paper we show how two (or more) air-
gapped computers in the same room, equipped with passive
speakers, headphones, or earphones can covertly exchange data
via ultrasonic waves. Microphones are not required. Our method
is based on the capability of a malware to exploit a specific
audio chip feature in order to reverse the connected speakers
from output devices into input devices - unobtrusively rendering
them microphones [29]. We discuss the attack model and provide
technical background and implementation details. We show that
although the reversed speakers/headphones/earphones were not
originally designed to perform as microphones, they still respond
well to the near-ultrasonic range (18kHz to 24kHz). We evaluate
the communication channel with different equipment, and at
various distances and transmission speeds, and also discuss some
practical considerations. Our results show that the speaker-to-
speaker communication can be used to covertly transmit data
between two air-gapped computers positioned a maximum of
nine meters away from one another. Moreover, we show that two
(microphone-less) headphones can exchange data from a distance
of three meters apart. This enables ’headphones-to-headphones’
covert communication, which is discussed for the first time in
this paper.
I. INTRODUCTION
Two (or more) computers in the same room are considered
to be separated by an ’air-gap’ if there is no physical or
logical connection between them. In the context of cyber
security, this measure is taken in order to ensure strict isolation
between nearby computers. A common scenario involves two
computers in the same room, where each computer is con-
nected to a separate network of the organization. The air-gap
separation ensures that data cannot be exchanged between the
two networks, and more specifically, in a situation in which
two computers have been compromised with a malware, data
cannot be sent from one computer to the other and vice versa.
A. Speaker-to-Microphone Covert Channel
Despite the high degree of isolation provided by air-gapping,
it doesn’t provide a hermetic solution. It is known that the
air-gap between two computers in the same room can be
’bridged’ if the two computers are equipped with speakers and
microphone [33], [13]. That is, the two computers can covertly
exchange data via inaudible sound waves. In this type of
communication, one computer transmits the data to the other
via high frequency sound (usually at 18kHz or higher), using
its loudspeaker. The receiver computer uses its microphone to
receive the data. The speaker-to-microphone communication
described above is mainly relevant for laptops, which have
built-in speakers and microphones. Hence, previous research
on this covert channel has primarily focused on laptops [33].
B. Microphone-less Environments
The speaker-to-microphone covert channel has one main
drawback: in many real-life IT environments, microphones are
not available to the attacker. The common cases include:
• Desktop workstations. Unlike laptops which have inte-
grated microphones, desktop workstations are not always
connected with an external microphone.
• Secure environments. In secure environments, micro-
phones in desktop computers may be prohibited (or dis-
connected) to avoid the risk of eavesdropping. In secure
environments, microphones may be forbidden in order
to maintain an ’audio-gap’ between computers. Elimina-
tion of microphones is an effective defense against the
speaker-to-microphone covert channel discussed above
[14].
• Disabled/muted microphones. A computer (desktop
workstation or laptop) may be equipped with a micro-
phone, which at some point was disabled, muted (with a
physical ’off’ button), or taped [5]. This typically occurs
when the user wants to increase security and ensure
confidentiality.
Consequently, the speaker-to-microphone covert channel
limits the attacker’s abilities, allowing the attacker to operate
only in environments where microphones are present and
enabled.
C. Speaker-to-Speaker Covert Channel
In this paper we show how the air-gap between two isolated
computers can be bridged in ’speakers-only’ environments.
That is, where two computers in the same room are not
equipped with microphones but are equipped with different
types of output devices: (microphone-less) headphones,
(microphone-less) earphones/earbuds, or passive speakers.
Our method is based on the capability of a malware to
transform a computer speaker from an output device into an
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input device - inconspicuously changing its role from speaker
to microphone and vice versa [29]. The two computers can
then be used to send data (by using the speakers) and receive
data (by using the transformed speakers) via inaudible sound.
The contribution of this paper is as follows:
• Attack model. We extensively discuss the speaker-to-
speaker communication attack model of bridging the air-
gap between two desktop computers. We also discuss and
evaluate different types of speakers and headphones and
their response to the ultrasonic range.
• Speakers-to-headphones. We discuss and evaluate
the never discussed before threat of the speaker-to-
headphones and headphones-to-headphones communica-
tion channel. We show that two pairs of headphones can
establish covert ultrasonic communication from a distance
of three meters apart.
• Evaluation. We evaluate the speaker-to-speaker ultra-
sonic covert channel. In particular, we evaluate the
acoustic response of passive speakers, headphones, and
earphones to the near-ultrasonic range, when transformed
into microphones (recall that such speakers are not de-
signed to function as input devices).
• Transmission protocol. We provide a protocol stack
designed for speaker-to-speaker communication. In this
covert channel, the two computers must synchronize and
change the speakers’ roles (from speakers to microphones
and vice versa) during the communication. We developed
an appropriate protocol to handle this mutual communi-
cation.
• Practical considerations. We discuss and evaluate
practical considerations regarding this covert channel,
particularly, the effect of environmental noise on the
channel’s quality. We also discuss the position of the
speakers and its effect on the signal strength.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Technical
background is provided in Section II. Related work is pre-
sented in Section III. The attack is discussed in Section IV.
Communication details are provided in Section V. Section VI
describes the analysis and evaluation results. Countermeasures
are discussed in Section VII. We conclude in Section VIII.
II. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide the technical background
necessary to understand the attack itself. An essential
part of the speaker-to-speaker covert channel is mal-
ware’s ability to record audio signals through the speak-
ers/headphones/earphones connected to the computer. In the
following subsection, we describe this issue and discuss its
limitations.
A. Speaker Reversibility
A speaker aims at amplifying audio streams out, but it can
actually be viewed as a microphone working in reverse mode:
a loudspeaker converts electric signals into a sound waveform,
TABLE I: Audio output devices and their reversibility
Device Reversible
Active speaker No
Passive speaker Yes
Headphones Yes
Earphones/earbuds Yes
while a microphone transforms sounds into electric signals.
More technically, speakers use the changing magnetic field
induced by electric signals to move a diaphragm in order to
produce sounds. Similarly, in microphone devices, a small
diaphragm moves through a magnetic field according to a
sound’s air pressure, inducing a corresponding electric signal
[12]. This bidirectional mechanism facilitates the use of a
simple speaker as a feasible microphone simply by plugging
it into a microphone jack. It should be clear that in practice,
speakers were not designed to perform as microphones, and
the recorded signals will be of low quality.
B. Jack Retasking
Interestingly, the audio chipsets in modern motherboards
and sound cards include an option to change the function
of an audio port at the software level, a type of audio port
programming sometimes referred to as ’jack retasking’.
This option is available on most audio chipsets (e.g.,
Realtek’s audio chipsets) integrated into PC motherboards
today. Jack retasking, although documented in the technical
specifications, is not well-known [34]. For an in-depth
technical discussion on malicious retasking of an audio
jack, from the hardware to the operating system level, we
refer the interested reader to the following previous work [29].
The fact that loudspeakers, headphones, earphones, and
earbuds are physically built like microphones, coupled with
the fact that an audio port’s role in the PC can be altered
programmatically, changing it from output to input, creates a
vulnerability which can be abused by attackers. A malware
can stealthily reconfigure the headphone jack from a line
out jack to a microphone jack. As a result, the connected
output device can function as a pair of recording microphones,
thereby rendering the computer a recording device - even when
the computer does not have a connected microphone.
C. Passive speakers, Headphones and Earphones
The reversibility of speakers poses a limitation, in that
the speaker must be passive (unpowered), without amplifier
transitions. In the case of an active (externally powered)
speaker, there is an amplifier between the jack and the speaker;
hence, the signal will not be passed from the output to
the input side [16]. Headphones, earphones, and earbuds are
built from a pair of passive speakers, and hence, are always
reversible. However, most PC loudspeakers today have an
internal amplifier [8]. Passive speakers mainly exist in legacy
and intercom systems [1].
Table I. lists the audio output devices and their reversibility.
Active speakers are not reversible, and hence, can only act
as the transmitting side in our covert channel. The receiving
side must be a computer connected with passive speakers,
headphones, or earphones.
III. RELATED WORK
Air-gap covert channels are special covert channels, which
enable communication from air-gapped computers - mainly for
a purpose of data exfiltration. They can be classified into five
main categories: electromagnetic, magnetic, acoustic, thermal,
and optical.
A. Electromangetic
In the past twenty years, several studies have proposed the
use of electromagnetic emanation from computers for covert
communication. Kuhn showed that it is possible to control
the electromagnetic emissions from computer displays [35].
Using this method, a malicious code can generated radio
signals and modulate data on top of them. In 2014, Guri et
al demonstrated AirHopper [23], [25], malware that exfiltrate
data from air-gapped computers to a nearby smartphone via
FM signals emitted from the screen cable. Later on Guri et al
also demonstrated GSMem [22], malware that leaks data from
air-gapped computers to nearby mobile-phones using cellular
frequencies generated from the buses which connect the RAM
and the CPU. In 2016, Guri et al showed USBee, a malware
that uses the USB data buses to generate electromagnetic
signals from a desktop computer [24].
B. Magnetic
In 2018, Guri et al presented ODINI [31], a malware
that can exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers via low
frequency magnetic signals generated by the computer’s CPU
cores. The magnetic fields bypass Faraday cages and metal
shields. Guri et al also demonstrated MAGNETO [20], which
is a malware that leak data from air-gapped computers to
nearby smartphones via magnetic signals. They used the
magnetic sensor integrated in smartphones to receive covert
signals. Matyunin suggested using magnetic head of hard disk
drives to generate magnetic emission, which can be received
by a nearby smartphone magnetic sensor [39].
C. Optical
Several studies have proposed the use of optical emanation
from computers for covert communication. Loughry intro-
duced the use of PC keyboard LEDs to encode binary data
[37]. In 2017, Guri et al presented LED-it-GO, a covert
channel that uses the hard drive indicator LED in order to
exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers [32]. Guri et al
also presented a method for data exfiltration from air-gapped
networks via router and switch LEDs [30]. Data can also be
leaked optically through fast blinking images or low contrast
bitmaps projected on the LCD screen [21]. In 2017, Guri
et al presented aIR-Jumper, a malware that uses the security
cameras and their IR LEDs to communicate with air-gapped
networks remotely [19].
D. Thermal
In 2015, Guri et al introduced BitWhisper [26], a thermal
covert channel allowing an attacker to establish bidirectional
communication between two adjacent air-gapped comput-
ers via temperature changes. The heat is generated by the
CPU/GPU of a standard computer and received by temperature
sensors that are integrated into the motherboard of the nearby
computer.
E. Acoustic
In acoustic covert channels, data is transmitted via inaudible,
ultrasonic sound waves. Audio based communication between
computers was reviewed by Madhavapeddy et al. in 2005
[38]. In 2013, Hanspach [33] used inaudible sound to
establish a covert channel between air-gapped laptops
equipped with speakers and microphones. Their botnet
established communication between two computers alocated
19 meters apart and can achieve a bit rate of 20 bit/sec.
Deshotels [15] demonstrated the acoustic covert channel with
smartphones, and showed that data can be transferred up
to 30 meters away. In 2013, security researchers claimed
to find a malware (dubbed BadBios) which communicates
between two instances of air-gapped laptops via the integrated
speakers and microphones using ultrasonic signals [3].
Speaker-less computers. All of the acoustic methods
presented above require speakers. In 2016, Guri et al
introduced Fansmitter, a malware which facilitates the
exfiltration of data from an air-gapped computer via noise
intentionally emitted from the PC fans [27]. In this method,
the transmitting computer does not need to be equipped with
audio hardware or an internal or external speaker. Guri et al
also presented DiskFiltration a method that uses the acoustic
signals emitted from the hard disk drive (HDD) moving arm
to exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers [28].
Microphone-less computers. The attack presented in the
current paper is relevant to environments in which the comput-
ers are not equipped with microphones, a common setup seen
in many IT environments. Guri et al presented Speake(a)r [29]
a malware that covertly turns the headphones, earphones, or
simple earbuds connected to a PC into a pair of eavesdropping
microphones when a standard microphone is not present,
muted, taped, or turned off. They discuss technical details
of this type of attack from the hardware to operating system
level. However, the work of Guri et al in [29] focuses on
the threat of conversation eavesdropping and did not discuss
the threat of ultrasonic covert channel. Lee et al. evaluate
the various acoustic (non-covert) channels, and suggested
establishment of communication between two loudspeakers.
However, with inaudible range (above 18kHz) they achieved
a limited distance of 10 centimeters [36]. They use passive
loudspeakers and didn’t evaluate headphones, earphones or
earbuds for the transmission and reception. As we noted, most
loudspeakers connected to PCs today have an integral amplifier
TABLE II: Summary of existing air-gap covert channels
Type Method
Electromagnetic
AirHopper [23], [25] (FM radio)
GSMem [22] (cellular frequencies)
USBee [24] (USB bus emission)
Funthenna [4] (GPIO emission)
Magnetic
MAGNETO [20] (CPU-generated
magnetic fields)
ODINI [31] (Faraday shields bypass)
Hard-disk-drive [39]
Acoustic
Fansmitter [27] (computer fan noise)
DiskFiltration [28] (hard disk noise)
Ultrasonic [33], [13]
MOSQUITO (speaker-to-speaker)
Thermal BitWhisper [26] (heat emission)
Optical
LED-it-GO [32] (hard drive LED)
VisiSploit [21] (invisible pixels)
Keyboard LEDs [37]
Router LEDs [30]
Optical (infrared) aIR-Jumper [19] (security cameras & infrared)
which prevents passing any signal from output to input.
Table II. summarizes the existing air-gap covert channels.
IV. ATTACK
In the attack scenario, two or more computers are located
in the same room - separated by an air-gap. That is, there
is no physical or logical network connection between the two
computers. The computers are not equipped with microphones
but are equipped with output devices: active speakers, passive
speakers, headphones, or earbuds. Fig. 1 illustrates three sce-
narios of the proposed covert channel. (A) speaker-to-speaker
communication, (B) speaker-to-headphones communication,
and (C) headphones-to headphones communication.
We distinguish between two types of communication.
• Two computers, one-way communication. In this case,
two air-gapped computers in the same room establish
unidirectional communication. This is the simplest case,
where one computer is a transmitter and the other is a
receiver. In this case, the transmitter is not necessarily
equipped with a reversible speaker (e.g., it might be
connected to an active loudspeaker).
• Two computers, bidirectional communication. In this
case, two air-gapped computers in the same room es-
tablish bidirectional communication. In this case, each of
the computers is a transmitter and a receiver. In this case,
both computers are equipped with reversible speakers.
A. Malware
The communicating computers are infected with a malware.
The malware has three operational components, described
below.
• Jack retasking. Reversing the output audio jacks into
input jacks, effectively turning the playing devices to
microphones. This technique is described in detail in [29].
• Synchronization. Synchronizing between the sender and
the receiver. This component is essential for a bidirec-
tional communication. By using the synchronization, the
malware determines when the speaker should be used as a
speaker and when it should be reversed to a microphone.
• Transmission and reception. Transmitting and receiving
the data. This component performs the modulation of the
data over ultrasonic waves and its demodulation back
to binary data. It also includes the bit framing and the
transmission protocol.
B. Air-Gap Communication
The attack presented in this paper allow attackers to transmit
data between two computers. For example, when one computer
is Internet connected and the other is an isolated, air-gapped
computer. In the initial phase, the two computers must be
infected with a malware. Note that it has been shown that
attackers can successfully compromise air-gapped networks by
using complex attack vectors, such as supply chain attacks,
malicious insiders, and social engineering [41], [17], [11].
For example, in 2017 WikiLeaks published a reference to a
hacking tool dubbed ’Brutal Kangaroo,’ used to infiltrate air-
gapped computers via USB drives [7]. When an employee of
the organization inserted an infected USB drive into the air-
gapped computer, a malicious code was executed.
Having established a foothold in both computers, the at-
tacker may bridge the air-gap between the internal and external
networks using the speaker-to-speaker covert channel. The at-
tacker can then exfiltrate information to the Internet connected
computer (e.g., documents, passwords and encryption keys).
Alternatively, the attacker may communicate with the isolated
network by issuing commands and receiving responses.
V. COMMUNICATION
In this section, we present the design and implementation
of the speaker-to-speaker communication. We discuss the
detection and synchronization protocol and present the data
modulation and encoding scheme. For this discussion, we
assume that there are two computers (or ’nodes’) denoted
as A and B. We present a generic protocol which assumes
that both A and B are connected with a passive speaker or
headphones/earphones. At the end of this section, we discuss
a case in which only one of the computers is equipped with a
reversible speaker, allowing only unidirectional (rather than
bidirectional) communication. Note that for simplicity we
present the basic case with only two communicating peers.
A. Protocol Stack
The approach taken by other research on the ultrasonic
covert channel is to use the existing implementation of pro-
tocol stacks originally designed for acoustic (non-ultrasonic)
communication (e.g., [33], [43]). In this paper, we choose to
implement our own light, stripped-down audio protocol stack
for the evaluation of the covert channel.
speaker-to-speaker communication 
speaker-to-headphones communication 
headphones-to-headphones communication 
(no microphone)
(no microphone)
(no microphone)
A
B
C
Ultrasonic (18-24kHz)
Ultrasonic (18-24kHz)
Ultrasonic (18-24kHz)
Fig. 1: The three communication scenarios of the proposed covert channel. (A) speaker-to-speaker communication, (B) speaker-
to-headphones communication, and (C) headphones-to-headphones communication
B. The Near-Ultrasonic Range
Human hearing is limited to sound waves of 20kHz. In
covert channel research it is acceptable to classify the range
above 18kHz as practically inaudible for adults [15], [48].
In 2016, a group of researchers performed in-depth analysis
on the emerging threat of ultrasonic cross-device tracking
(uXDT). They found that ultrasound beacons (uBeacons) at
a range of 18kHz to 20kHz are embedded into websites and
TV advertisements [40]. The beacons are then picked up
apps installed on nearby smartphones. Accordingly, in this
paper, we consider the frequency range of 18kHz to 24kHz
acceptable for the covert communication.
C. Data Modulation
In audio frequency-shift keying (AFSK) digital data is
represented by changes in the frequency of an audio tone.
AFSK is used to transmit binary data over radio and telephony
systems. For the data transmission we implemented binary
frequency-shift keying (B-FSK) modulation. In B-FSK the
data is represented by a change in the frequency of a carrier
wave. In our case, two different audio frequencies f0 and f1 in
the range of 18kHz to 24kHz represent two different symbols
’0’ and ’1.’
D. Bit-Framing
The data packets are transmitted in small frames. Each
frame consists of 46 bits and is comprised of preamble,
payload, and CRC (cyclic redundancy check), as shown in
Fig. 2.
Preamble. The preamble is transmitted at the beginning
of every packet. It consists of a sequence of six alternating
bits (’101010’) which helps the receiver determine the
properties of the channel, such as the carrier wave frequency
and the bit period (bit rate). In addition, the preamble header
allows the receiver to detect the beginning of the transmission
of each packet. This is important for our covert channel, since
in the case of the ultrasonic covert channel, a transmission
might get interrupted, e.g., if the computer was restarted in
the middle of an ongoing transmission.
Payload. The payload is the 32 bits of raw data which
contains the actual packet.
CRC. For error detection, we insert eight bits of CRC
code at the end of the frame. The receiver calculates the
CRC for the received payload, and if it differs from the
received CRC, an error is detected. In the case of error a
packet retransmission request is sent (only in the case of
bidirectional communication).
E. Communication Protocol
The acoustic channel is a type of shared communication
channel. There are different types of multiple access protocols
allowing a communication channel to be shared between many
nodes (e.g., TDMA, ALOHA and CSMA [44]). Recall that in
the proposed speaker-to-speaker communication a speaker can
function as either a transmitter (speaker) or receiver (micro-
phone) at a given time. Thus, each computer must know when
the speaker is being used as a speaker and when to reverse it
to a microphone. We used the concept of virtual ’tokens,’ in
which one computer acquires a transmission token. The other
computer is only allowed to transmit when a transmission
token is has been released. Each computer can hold the token
Preamble Payload CRC
Fig. 2: The spectrogram of the 46 bit frame (preamble, payload, and CRC) transmitted at 10 bit/sec using B-FSK modualtion
for a maximal time slot Tmax. When the computer has finished
the transmission, it releases the token and begins to listen.
The sequential flow of the communication between the two
computers is illustrated in Fig. 3. At the beginning of the
transmission, computer A acquires the transmission token,
transmits n frames, and releases the token. Computer B then
acquires the token, transmits m frames, and releases the token.
Speaker Speaker as mic … …
Speaker as micSpeaker … …
Transmit frames
Receive frames Transmit frames
Receive frames
Time
𝑛 frames 𝑚 frames 𝑘 frames
Token 
acquired (A)
Token 
released (A)
Token 
acquired (B) 
Token 
released (B)
Token 
acquired (A)
A 
B
Fig. 3: The communication protocol between computers A and
B
F. Discovery Broadcast Message
In order to establish the covert communication channel,
the computers have to acknowledge each other’s presence. To
that end, each computer sends a broadcast message called a
discovery beacon. The discovery beacon contains eight bits,
which encode the computer identifier (ID). The identifier is a
random number generated once at the beginning of a commu-
nication session. Since the computers are not connected, both
computers might initially choose the same identifier. This case
is handled by a simple rule: the first computer that detects the
ID collision randomizes and broadcasts its ID. In order to
discover the other computer, each computer is performs the
discovery scheme outlined in Algorithm 1.
Each computer starts by broadcasting its ID at random
times every 5000ms. Note that a random time is used in
order to avoid collision with a discovery message sent by the
other computer, a technique which is used in communication
for collision avoidance [46]. Following the ID broadcast, the
computer retasks its speaker to a microphone. It waits for
Algorithm 1
1: while (state != DISCOVERED) do
2: wait(random(5000))
3: jack retask(SPEAKER)
4: transmit(discoveryMessage(ID))
5: jack retask(MIC)
6: message← waitForDiscoveryAck(5000)
7: if (message) then
8: set state(DISCOV ERED)
9: end if
10: end while
a discovery acknowledgment message sent from the other
computer. If an acknowledgment message is received, it stops
broadcasting the discovery message.
G. Type of Messages
Table III shows the main control messages in our proto-
col, including the DISCOVERY, ACQUIRE and RELEASE
messages described earlier in this section.
TABLE III: Control messages
# Message Description
1 DISCOVERY The discovery broadcast message
2 ACQUIRE Acquire the transmission token
3 RELEASE Release the transmission token
4 ACK OK Frame received successfully (ack)
5 RETRANSMIT Request to retransmit a frame
6 BITRATE INC Increase the current bit rate (+5%)
7 BITRATE DEC Decrease the current bit rate (-5%)
The ACK OK message notifies the other computer that the
message was received successfully and confirms that the CRC
was correct. The RETRANSMIT message requests the other
computer to retransmit a frame (e.g., if the CRC is incorrect).
The BITRATE INC and BITRATE DEC messages enable
the two computers to agree on increasing up or decreasing
down the current transmission rate in 5%. In particular, the
messages enable adaptive use of the channel speed to cope
with environmental noise.
H. Unidirectional Communication
There are scenarios in which only one computer is equipped
with a reversible speaker, while the other has an ordinary
(active) speaker. In this scenario, bidirectional communication
is not possible.
Speaker as mic
Speaker 
Transmit frames
Receive frames
Time
𝑛 frames
A 
B
Fig. 4: The unidirectional communication between computers
A and B
This scenario is illustrated in Fig. 4, where computer A
has an active (non-reversible) speaker and computer B has a
reversible speaker. Computer A transmits a stream of n frames
to computer B, which receives it via the reversible speaker.
Note that acknowledgments and retransmissions messages are
not applicable in the case of unidirectional communication.
Since in this case the transmitter and the receiver can’t
establish a handshake, the malware could simply be designed
to initiate a data transmission and reception at a specified,
predefined times (e.g, at midnight).
VI. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
Headphones, earphones, and passive speakers were not
designed to perform as microphones in terms of quality and
frequency range. In this section, we assess the efficacy of the
speaker-to-speaker communication and present an empirical
analysis of its corresponding channel capacity. We also dis-
cuss various practical considerations concerning the ultrasonic
covet channel. Note that we are mainly interested in the high
frequency regions that offer high channel capacity while at the
same time have low auditory awareness.
A. Channel Capacity
Channel capacity (C) is a measure of the theoretical upper
bound on the rate at which information can be transmitted
over a communication channel. We assume that S is the power
of the signal conveying the information and is corrupted
by additive interfering Gaussian noise, with power N . The
available communication bandwidth is B (in Hz). Given that,
the channel capacity in bits per second can be calculated
using the Shannon-Hartley theorem:
C = Blog2(1 +
S
N
) (1)
Intuitively, this formula informs us that the higher the signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR), and channel bandwidth, the higher the
amount of information that can be conveyed.
We calculate the capacity of a communication channel
formed between two loudspeakers, one of which serves as
a transmitter and the other serves as a receiver. In these
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Fig. 5: Channel capacity of speaker-to-speaker communication
experiments, a sweep sinusoid of ten second in length at a
range of 1Hz to 24kHz is played from the transmitter and
recorded by the receiver. We use the Praat [9] tool to perform
a short-time spectral analysis of the received signal.
Measurement setup. We evaluate the channel capacity
for distances of one, four and eight meters between the
transmitter and the receiver. To that end, we tested three
off-the-shelf passive loudspeakers as receivers: (1) Logitech
Z523, (2) Logitech Z213, and (3) Philips SPA5300. We also
tested a pair of small Samsung earbuds for comparison. The
loudspeakers were connected to a retaskable audio output
jack on an Optiplex 9020 desktop PC. The sweep signal was
played through a Logitech Z100 loudspeaker connected to a
Gigabyte GA-H97M-D3H desktop workstation, (Intel Core
i7-4790) running Ubuntu 16.04.1 kernel 4.4.0.
Calculations. The signal is analyzed in successive Gaussian
windows of 200 milliseconds with 25% overlap in time.
We adopt a frequency resolution of 100Hz for each band,
resulting in 250 analyzed bands. The SNR is estimated for
each frequency band, as the power ratio of the received signal
and the measured noise in this band.
Fig. 5 presents the evaluated channel capacity for the
entire frequency range. We can observe that for the 1m, 4m
and 8m setups, the theoretical upper bound for the channel
capacity is between 1200 bit/sec and 1800 bit/sec for the
audible frequency bands (lower than 18kHz). As expected, the
channel capacity is correlated with the distance between the
transmitter and the receiver. The channel capacity significantly
degrades in the sub-bass range (up to about 60Hz) and for high
frequencies (above 18kHz). In these ranges, the theoretical
upper bound is between 300 bit/sec and 600 bit/sec in
most cases. The reason for that is that loudspeakers, and
particularly home grade PC loudspeakers, were projected and
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Fig. 6: Channel capacity of speaker-to-headphones communi-
cation
optimized for human auditory characteristics, and therefore
they are more responsive to the audible frequency ranges.
1) Headphones, Earphones and Earbuds: We also calculate
the capacity of a communication channel in which headphones,
earphones and earbuds are used as receivers. Similar to the
previous experiment, we sweep sinusoid of ten-second length
in a range of 1Hz to 24kHz and record it by the headphones.
We evaluate the channel capacity for one, five and eight
meters. We tested four types of headphones (1) Philips vibes
earbuds, (2) Philips SHS3300 earhooks, (3) Logitech h110
headphones and (4) Philips SHL3850NC headphones. The
headphones were connected to a retaskable audio output jack
on the desktop PC described above.
The results are shown in Fig. 6. We observed that
loudspeakers do not perform significantly better as receivers
than earbuds or headphones, as one could expect. In particular,
for the 1m, 5m, and 8m setups, the theoretical upper bound
for the channel capacity is between 300 bit/sec and 600
bit/sec in most cases.
2) Headphones-to-Headphones Communication: To com-
plete the whole picture, we demonstrate the effects of using
headphones as both the transmitter and the receiver. The test
signal was played through the h110 headphones and captured
by the SHL3850NC headphones. Fig. 7 presents the evaluated
channel capacity for the entire frequency range. The results
indicates that the headphone-to-headphone communication is
limited to about three meters. The channel capacity at high
frequencies (above 18kHz) is limited to 250 bit/sec. In the
context of the attack model, this implies that headphones-to-
headphones communication is relevant only in certain cases,
e.g., where the headphones are located side by side, or on two
adjacent tables.
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B. Practical Considerations
In this sub-section, we discuss the practical considerations
concerning the ultrasonic covert channel. We examine the
effect of environmental noise on the channel, the equipment’s
position and the feasible transmission rates in a typical work-
ing place.
1) Environmental Noise (music and speech): We start by
examining a situation in which the covert channel is employed
in a setting in which there is an interfering noise signal. For
instance, when music is being played or people are talking in
the room. In this case, our channel capacity might be decreased
due to the SNR conditions. We demonstrates the background
noise scenario by playing a series of high definition (HD)
music clips in the room. The series includes pop, rock and
classical music clips randomly chosen from YouTube. For
human speech we played Bill Gates’ speech delivered at
Harvard University1. Fig. 8 shows the normalized power
spectral density (PSD) of the interfering music. The PSD
shows how the power of the generated signals is distributed
over the entire frequency band (1Hz-24kHz). It can be seen
1Bill Gates’ speech at Harvard University
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3bDqJp-NgF4)
that although the interfering noise spreads throughout the
whole frequency band, a very small amount of energy is
concentrated above 18kHz. The same is true for interfering
speech, since it is narrow banded in comparison to music.
Moreover, the human speech intensity is highly concentrated
at relatively low frequency bands. The speech of an adult male
has a fundamental frequency ranging from 85Hz to 180Hz,
and that of an adult female ranges from 165Hz to 255Hz. The
spectral view shows that a covert transmission above 18kHz
would experience less interference from background music or
human speech in the room.
2) Positions: The communicating transmitters and receivers
might be positioned in various layouts and directions. In
the acoustic channel, the position of the transmitters and
receivers significantly affects the quality of the received signal
[18]. Specifically, the SNR degrades when the transmitter
and receiver speakers are not aligned. In acoustics, directivity
describes the way a speaker’s (or microphone’s) frequency
response changes at off axis angles [47]. A wide directivity
speaker maintains the signal quality consistency between the
on and off axis while narrow directivity speaker is one where
the signals quality is substantially different between the on and
off axis. The computer loudspeakers are of narrow directivity,
and hence, they loose off axis response at lower frequencies
compared to the on axis response. This phenomenon is called
”beaming” and intuitively corresponds to the sensation of fre-
quency unbalance experienced when one moves from side to
side across a speaker [42]. Beaming affects higher frequencies
more than the lower spectrum. In theory, off-axis begins to
affect the response at frequencies having a wavelength close
to the diameter of the radiating cone. The approximate starting
beaming frequency f is provided by:
f ≈ c/D (2)
where c is the speed of sound ( 340 m/s) and D is the
diameter of the speaker cone. Therefore, considering a PC
speaker having a 10cm. cone diameter, beaming will start
at approximately 3400Hz. In practice, the geometry of the
radiation cone and other factors cause beaming to start at
lower frequencies, as was observed in our experiments. Fig.
9 displays the spectrum of a sweep signal received by a
reversed loudspeaker from different angles with regard to the
transmitter speaker. As expected, the off-axis response at 30,
60 and 90 degrees significantly decreases for increasing angles.
The SNR degradation is visibly stronger at high frequencies.
Interestingly, due to their reduced cone diameter, headphones
and earbuds in transmitting mode are less affected by beaming.
3) Bit Error Rate: The transmission rates of the ultrasonic
covert channel have been extensively measured in several prior
work [33], [13], [15]. In this research, we aim at examining
the practical considerations of the covert channel and the
corresponding transmission rate with the speaker-to-speaker
communication. That is, we measure the transmission rates
that yield low bit error rates (1˜%) during the transmissions.
Note that the channel capacity discussed earlier represents the
upper theoretical limits of the communication channel. The
actual bit rate is usually lower than the channel capacity and
is determined by the modulation scheme and the quality of
the transmitter and receiver used. Our experiments shows that
at a distance of three meters between two speakers (Z523
and Z213), a transmission rate of 166 bit/sec results in a
1% bit error rate, during the exfiltration of a 1Kbit binary
file. However, at distances of 4-9 meters, the 1% bit error
rate is only achieved at transmission rates of 10 bit/sec. Our
waveform analysis shows that the signal quality is degraded
at distances greater than four meters mainly due to the
environmental noise, which results in a lower SNR.
VII. COUNTERMEASURES
Countermeasures can be categorized into hardware and
software countermeasures.
In highly secure facilities it is common practice to forbid the
use of any types of loudspeakers (passive or active) to create
so-called audio-gap separation between computers [14]. Less
restrictive policies prohibit the use of microphones but allow
one-way loudspeakers. Such a policy was suggested by the
NSTISSAM TEMPEST/2-95, RED/BLACK guide [1]. In this
guide the protective measures state that ”Amplifiers should be
considered for speakers in higher classified areas to provide
reverse isolation to prevent audio from being heard in lesser
classified areas.” Accordingly, some TEMPEST certified loud-
speakers are shipped with amplifiers and one-way fiber input
[10]. However, the aforementioned policies and protective
countermeasures are not relevant to most modern headphones,
which are primarily non-powered, and built without amplifiers.
A general solution for all kinds of speakers and headphones
is to implement the amplifier on-board, integrating it within
the audio chipset.
A different approach is to mask ultrasonic transmissions
in certain area by using ultrasonic jammers. These devices
generate ultrasonic background noise aimed at interfering with
the covert communication signals. [2]. Note that this type of
solution is not trivial to deploy on a wide scale since the
jamming range is limited to a radius of a few meters to a single
room. The jamming efficacy also depends on the distance from
the potential transmitters and receivers. Carrara [13] suggested
monitoring the audio channel for abnormally peaks of energy,
in order to detect hidden transmissions in the area. In our case,
the ultrasonic frequency range above 18kHz should be scanned
(continuously) and analyzed. However, as noted in [13], if the
hardware device scanning the ultrasonic spectrum is far from
the transmitter this approach may not be effective.
Software countermeasures include completely disabling the
audio hardware in the UEFI/BIOS. This can prevent a malware
from accessing the audio codec from the operating system
level. However, such a configuration eliminates the use of the
audio hardware (e.g., for playing audio), and hence, may not be
feasible in all cases. Another option is to install a HD audio
driver that prevents jack retasking or enforces a strict jack
retasking policy. To provide general software-level protection,
anti-malware and intrusion detection systems can employ
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TABLE IV: Defensive Countermeasures
Countermeasure Advantages Limitations
Prohibit the use of headphones/earphones/speakers Hermetic protection Poor usability
Use active speakers / on-board amplifiers Hermetic protection Not relevant for headphones and earphones
Disable audio codec in BIOS/UEFI Easy to deploy Poor usability
Detect jack retasking / enforce jack retasking policies Easy to deploy Can be evaded by advanced malware & rootkits
Use ultrasonic noise emitters (signal jamming) Generic solution Hard to deploy due to the noise generated
Detect ultrasonic transmission (signal detection) External (non-invasive) Reliability
Low-pass filters (software/hardware) Generic solution Deployment and additional cost (hardware filters)
a monitoring driver which detects unauthorized speaker-to-
mic retasking operations and block them. Another approach
proposed by [33] is to filter out the inaudible frequencies at
the range of 18kHz and higher with a low-pass or bandpass
filter. Recently, a software based ultrasonic firewall (dubbed
SilverDog) was implemented for the Google Chrome browser
[6]. This open-source project aims at blocking cross-device
tracking which utilizes ultrasonic beacons (uBeacons) [40].
To prevent a malware initiated ultrasonic covert channel, the
filter could be implemented as an audio filter (or ’mixer’) in
the operating system. The main drawback of this approach is
that it can be disabled or bypassed by advanced malware and
rootkits. For an increased level of protection, we implemented
the low-pass filter as a trusted component in hardware. Fig. 10
shows the circuit design of a low-pass filter with an amplifier,
for a 3.5mm audio jack. Note that the cutoff frequency of in
this filter is determined by the capacitor C and the resistor R.
In our case, the circuit pass signals with a frequency lower
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Fig. 10: Low-pass filter circuit for 3.5mm audio jack
than 18kHz and attenuates signals with frequencies higher
than 18kHz. For technical information on low-pass filters and
their functionality, we refer the interested reader to relevant
textbooks in this topic [45]. The countermeasures are listed
and summarized in Table IV.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is known that covert communication can be established
between two nearby air-gapped computers, enabling them
to communicate to one another via ultrasonic waves [33].
However, the standard attack model requires the two com-
puters to be equipped with both speakers and microphones.
Consequently, this type of covert channel is not applicable in
secure facilities where it is common practice to prohibit the
use of microphones [14]. Also, many desktop workstations
lack microphones or the microphones have been physically
muted or turned off [5]. In this work, we show how air-
gapped computers without microphones can still exchange data
via ultrasonic waves. The computers must be connected to
passive speakers, headphones, or earphones. Our method is
based on the capability of a malware to transform a PC’s
connected speaker from an output device to an input device,
unobtrusively changing its role from a speaker to a microphone
[29]. We show that although the reversed speakers are not
designed to function as microphones, they are still sensitive
to high frequency sound waves at a range of 18kHz to
24kHz. Transmissions in this range are practically inaudible
to most adults, and hence this channel is considered covert.
We evaluate the communication channel and present three
attack scenarios: (1) speaker-to-speaker communication, (2)
speaker-to-headphones communication, and (3) headphones-
to-headphones communication. Our results show that by using
loudspeakers, data can be exchanged over an air-gap from a
distance of eight meters away with an effective bit rate of
10 - 166 bit/sec. When using two headphones, the distance
is limited to three meters away. This enables ’headphones-to-
headphones’ covert communication, which is discussed for the
first time.
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